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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jess Wade Yost appeals from the district court's order revoking probation.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Yost with two counts of sexual battery on a child 16 or
17 years of age and one count of possession of sexually exploitative materials.
(R., pp. 53-54.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Yost pied guilty to one count of
sexual battery and the state dismissed the other two felony counts. (R., pp. 6970.) The district court entered judgment, imposing a sentence of 25 years with
five years determinate and retaining jurisdiction.

(R., pp. 79-85.)

The court

subsequently suspended execution of the sentence and placed Yost on
probation. (R., pp. 93-97.)
About 10 months later the state filed a motion to revoke probation, based
on a report that Yost had been discharged from his treatment program "for noncompliance

with

his

treatment

requirements,"

viewing

and

possessing

pornographic materials (including multiple copies of the same video underlying
the charges in this case), having unauthorized internet access, and violating the
law by possessing child pornography (the video of the victim). (R., pp. 124-131.)
Pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution, Yost admitted all of the reported
probation violations except the one related to having the video involving his prior
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victim. (R., p. 146; Supp. Tr., p. 4, L. 15

p. 5, L. 3; p. 8, L. 13 - p. 11, L. 3. 1)

The district court executed the sentence, but reduced the fixed portion to three
years. (R., pp. 155-158.) Yost filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 161-63.)

There are two transcripts in this case. The one containing the final probation
violation disposition hearing on June 8, 2015, will be herein cited as "Tr." while
the transcript of the January 26, 2015 admit hearing and the March 2, 2015
disposition hearing will be cited as "Supp. Tr."
1
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ISSUES
Yost states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Yost's equal protection and
due process rights when it revoked probation due to Mr.
Yost's indigent status?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Yost's probation?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Yost failed to show the district court committed fundamental error by
not finding that his probation violations were the result of indigence where
Yost did not claim that his violations were the result of indigence and he
presented no evidence that his violations were the result of indigence?

2.

Has Yost failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked probation?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Yost Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental Error By
Not Finding That His Probation Violations Were The Result Of Indigence Where
Yost Neither Claimed Nor Presented Evidence That His Violations Were The
Result Of Indigence

A.

Introduction
Yost claims for the first time on appeal that "his equal protection and due

process rights were violated by the district court's revocation of his probation due
to his indigent status." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) The claim that Yost's probation
was revoked "due to his indigent status" is demonstrably false. Indigence played
little, if any, role in the revocation. Rather, Yost's probation violations were failing
to attend counselling, possessing pornography, and having unauthorized internet
access. Yost has failed to demonstrate fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must show that
some action or inaction "(1) violates one or more of his unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
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to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at
228, 245 P.3d at 980.

C.

Yost's Claim Of A Violation Of His Due Process And Equal Protection
Rights Is Unsupported By The Record
Applying principles of due process and equal protection, the Supreme

Court of the United States has stated that if a "probationer has made all
reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no
fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke probation automatically
without considering whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the
defendant are available."

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983).

However, "the reasons for non-payment [are] of critical importance."

kl

at 668.

The state is "perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction" when the
probationer has "willfully refused to pay" or has not made "sufficient bona fide
efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay."

kl

This standard

has been applied by the Idaho Court of Appeals in the context of inability to pay
for rehabilitative treatment and adequately safe housing. State v. Braaten, 144
Idaho 606, 608-09, 167 P.3d 357, 359-60 (Ct. App. 2007). 2 Review of the record
shows that Yost has failed to demonstrate he made "all reasonable efforts" to
comply with the terms of his probation.

He also failed to show "adequate"

methods of achieving the goals of probation other than sex offender treatment.

The Supreme Court of the United States has not considered whether due
process and equal protection standards apply to automatic revocation of
probation and parole outside of the non-payment of fines and restitution. Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610-11 (1985).
2
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Yost violated his probation by not complying with his sex offender
treatment, owning and viewing pornography, and having unauthorized internet
access. (R., pp. 124-131, 146; Supp. Tr., p. 4, L. 15 - p. 5, L. 3; p. 8, L. 13 - p.
11, L. 3.)

There is no evidence that the last two of these violations had anything

to do with his claim of indigence. To the contrary, the more obvious inference is
that Yost had to pay for his pornography and internet. Thus, Yost has failed to
show that his probation violations were the result of his indigence.
In addition, the nexus between Yost's discharge from sex offender
treatment and indigence is tenuous at best.

The discharge summary by the

treatment provider states Yost was discharged "for non-compliance with
treatment requirements. He was not complying with weekly group and monthly
session attendance and was in Treatment Hold Status because his balance was
more than $200 past due." (R., p. 130.) The probation officer's report stated that
Yost had "attended group and individual sessions inconsistently." (R., p. 126.)
When Yost admitted violating his probation he stated both that he "didn't go" and
that he was discharged "for financial reasons." (Supp. Tr., p. 8, L. 13 - p. 9, L.
6.)
At the initial disposition hearing Yost represented that he had paid his
outstanding balance at the treatment provider and was thus eligible to renew that
treatment. (Supp. Tr., p. 16, L. 21 - p. 17, L. 15; p. 20, L. 21 - p. 21, L. 7.) The
district court, based on that representation, set over the disposition hearing to
see whether Yost would become "fully engaged in treatment," stay "current on
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[his] financial obligations," and be "otherwise compliant with all of [the] Court's
terms and conditions." (Supp. Tr., p. 21, Ls. 14-22.)
In the first three months after the district court set over the disposition so
Yost could prove he could comply with probation he "attended 3 of 16 possible
groups," did not attend "any of the required monthly individual sessions," and did
not obtain a required polygraph. (R., p. 150.) Yost's counsel represented that
the group sessions cost "around $45 apiece."

(Tr., p. 7, Ls. 15-16.)

Thus,

despite working full time and living with his parents (R., p. 150; but see Tr., p. 6,
Ls. 7-13 (counsel representing that Yost pays his parents rent and pays his own
food and transportation-but no evidence of this was provided)), Yost averaged
payments of only $45 per month toward sex offender treatment. 3
The record does not show Yost "made all reasonable efforts" to acquire
the treatment, yet could not "through no fault of his own" due to indigence.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-69. The record at least strongly suggests that Yost's
efforts to obtain sex offender treatment were less than optimal.
Even if Yost had made all reasonable efforts, the record does not suggest
there were "adequate alternative methods" of achieving the goals of probation.

Yost never presented any evidence of his financial situation. Rather, most of
his claims were presented in the form of assertions by Yost's counsel. There are
some disturbing inconsistencies in Yost's trial counsel's representations,
however. For example, during the March 2, 2015 disposition hearing counsel
represented that "Mr. Yost has paid off that balance and now has a zero balance
with H & H Treatment and is eligible to start treatment again" and had even
"saved up some funds so he can pay for those sessions." (Supp. Tr., p. 17, Ls.
8-15.) At the June 8, 2015 disposition, however, counsel represented that Yost
"was not able to get that balance [he owed H & H Treatment] paid off ... until very
recently in April." (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 2-12.) Both of these contradictory factual claims
cannot be true.
3

7

kL_; see also Braaten, 144 Idaho at 609-10, 167 P.3d at 360-61 (finding that
although lack of treatment and housing was due to indigence, there were no
adequate alternatives to imprisonment). There is nothing in the record indicating
there were alternatives to incarceration where sex offender treatment in the
community was not an option (for whatever reason).
At the twice-continued disposition hearing the district court recognized the
"financial concerns" of obtaining treatment in the community, but "given the
nature of the underlying offense, if the defendant does not have the financial
ability to fully and completely participate in sex offender treatment as required in
the community, certainly that treatment is available in the correctional setting and
financial ability does not interfere." (Tr., p. 9, L. 18 - p. 10, L. 5 (extraneous
comma omitted).) Yost claims that this statement shows the court was punishing
him for his indigence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11.) A fair reading of what the
district court said shows it concluded that treatment was "required," and if it was
not possible in the "community" due to non-payment it had to happen "in the
correctional setting." (Tr., p. 9, L. 18 - p. 10, L. 5.) This determination shows
that alternatives to incarceration were considered.

Moreover, the district court

took extra steps (in the form of granting continuances) to provide Yost every
opportunity to get treatment in the community rather than in the correctional
setting. The district court gave Yost every opportunity to prove he could get the
needed sex offender treatment in the community, but he showed he could not.
Yost suggests that the "alternative means" to achieve the goals of
probation would be to "meet with his probation officer to develop budgeting and
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money management skills." (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) The flaw in this argument is

if the problem is so easily solved, Yost cannot claim to have made "all
reasonable efforts" to address it.

The record does not contain any viable

alternative to sex offender treatment to achieve the goals of probation.
Therefore, when treatment was not available in the community because Yost
either could not or would not pay for it, there was no choice but to obtain that
treatment in the correctional setting.
Yost's claim fails on the first two prongs of the fundamental error standard.
Nothing in this record gives confidence that Yost was actually doing everything
he reasonably could to comply with probation, or that his non-compliance could
be fixed by learning basic budgeting skills.

Yost has not shown that his

constitutional due process or equal protection rights were violated, or that the
claimed error is clear on the record.
Finally, Yost has failed to show prejudice. In addition to not attending sex
offender treatment, Yost violated his probation by possessing and viewing
pornography and having unauthorized internet access-violations completely
unrelated to his financial situation.

Yost has failed to show that he was

prejudiced, because even discounting the failure of treatment there were ample
grounds for revoking his probation.
Although Yost was certainly failing to pay for his sex offender treatment, it
is far from clear from the record that this was why he was missing sessions or
that he could not have made paying for sex offender treatment a higher financial
priority. Moreover, there is no record showing alternatives to incarceration if Yost
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could or would not obtain sex offender treatment.

Finally, Yost violated his

probation in ways that had nothing to do with his alleged lack of financial
resources.

Yost has failed to show any of the three prongs of a fundamental

error claim because his constitutional rights were not violated, no error is clear on
the record, and there is no showing of prejudice.

11.
Yost Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Order Revoking
Probation
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). Review of the
record shows no abuse of discretion.
Yost, at that time age 29, posted a video of him having sex with an
intoxicated 16-year-old girl. (Confidential Exhibits, p. 28.) He apparently posted
the video either in retaliation for the victim refusing to have sex with him a second
time or for the victim's father firing him from his job. (Id.) Although this was his
first felony conviction, he had been convicted of three prior misdemeanors. (Id.
at 30.)
Although he earned a probation recommendation, his performance on the
retained jurisdiction program was marginal. (Id. at 53-54.) His sex offender risk
assessment was in the "MODERATE-HIGH" range.

(Id. at 54.)

Within nine

months of being placed on probation Yost was both discharged from his sex
offender treatment and found with pornography involving adolescent females on
10

computer in folders containing the word "jailbait" in their titles. (R., pp. 126At that time he "admitted to viewing pornography over the past two months."
(R., p. 127.) The facts of the underlying crime and the nature of the probation

violations, combined with Yost's failure to pursue rehabilitation with any sort of
adequacy, show the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked
probation and imposed a reduced sentence. (Tr., p. 9, L. 4 - p. 10, L. 18.)
Yost claims that the only reason he did not pursue his sex offender
treatment was its cost. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) As shown above, review shows
that this claim is, at best, debatable.

Yost next claims that probation was

meeting its rehabilitative goal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) This claim is based
on the factually dubious assertion that his possession of pornography and getting
unauthorized internet access was the result of treatment being too expensive.
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.) The flaw in this argument is timing: Yost's probation
officer found pornography on his computer on September 22, 2014 and Yost
admitted he had accumulated the pornography over the prior two months (R., p.
127), while he was discharged from sex-offender treatment for non-compliance
on September 25, 2014 (R., p. 130).

There is no evidence in the record

suggesting that Yost would not have been downloading and viewing pornography
but for his failure to regularly attend sex offender treatment. On the contrary, the
record shows that Yost was simply less than entirely committed to rehabilitation.
He has failed to show an abuse of discretion on the record.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
revoking probation.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of December, 2015, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KENNETH K. JORGENS
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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